

Social Movements and
Global Social Change

The Rising Tide

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Chapter One

Social Movements and Global Social Change

Social movements have changed the world. During the past two hundred years, social movements overthrew monarchies, won independence from colonial empires, and founded republics in postcolonial states. They established “republics”—constitutional governments based on popular sovereignty—first in the United States and then in a majority of countries around the world. In some new republics, political factions established dictatorships and one-party regimes that denied people their rights and inflicted cruelties on them. In recent years, however, social movements fought successfully to overthrow many dictatorships and democratize a majority of the republics. Social movements also fought to expand citizenship in the republics. At first, only a small minority of the people in the republics could exercise suffrage and claim their rights as citizens. But social movements soon demanded that citizenship and suffrage be extended to others, and today a majority of residents in the republics claim citizenship.

These three developments—the rise of the republics, the democratization of the republics, and the expansion of citizenship in the republics—had important consequences. The demise of dynastic states brought an end to the ferocious rivalry for control of colonial empires that erupted in successive world wars. The fall of dictators brought an end to the dirty wars, gulags, and routine violence that regimes inflicted on subject populations. The expansion of citizenship curbed the violence of private, nonstate actors and restrained the violence deployed by state officials in the republics.

Although these developments were important achievements, global social change has been partial and incomplete. Dynastic rulers still cling to their thrones, dictatorships in many republics retain their grip on power, and citizenship has *nowhere* been granted to *all* the residents of *any* republic. The expansion of *liberty* has been accompanied by persistent *inequality*.

When thinking about social change, it is important to keep in mind *both* developments—growing liberty and persistent inequality—at the same time. To understand why social change resulted in these two contradictory developments, it is necessary to examine not only how social movements advanced and assisted social change but also how they obstructed, delayed, and compromised the meaning of social change.

STATES IN 1800

In 1800, most of the states in the interstate system were governed by dynastic monarchies. The kings and queens who ruled these states claimed their power as an inheritance and relied for their authority on the “divine right of kings.” The United States was the only country in the world that identified itself as a “republic.” This new republic differed from dynastic states in two respects. In a republic, the government derived its authority from the “people,” not from “God,” and was based on “popular sovereignty,” not the “divine right” of kings. Moreover, the people used their sovereign authority to create a binding set of contractual agreements that defined relations between the people and the government. As a result, they created constitutional government based on popular sovereignty in the republic. By contrast, the rulers of dynastic states accepted no binding legal restrictions on their authority. Governments in dynastic states provided to their subjects only the privileges that kings and queens might allow.

During the next two hundred years, the idea of creating constitutional government based on popular sovereignty in a republic spread around the world. The subsequent rise of the republics was accompanied by the fall of dynastic states. Today, a vast majority of the 193 states that belong to the United Nations call themselves republics.¹ Only a handful of dynastic monarchies remain. The rise of the republics transformed the character of the capitalist interstate system from one dominated by dynastic states to one based on nation-state republics.

When republics were first established in the Americas, Europe, Africa, and Asia, military leaders and political parties frequently seized power and

established dictatorships. They abrogated constitutions, dissolved legislatures, manipulated elections, looted public treasuries, and arrested, tortured, and murdered their opponents. But social movements in the republics eventually forced dictators from power and (re)established constitutional government based on popular sovereignty in a majority of the republics by the end of the twentieth century. Of course, dictators remain in power in many states, including China, the world’s largest republic.² The democratization of the republics transformed the political character of republican governments around the world.³

When they first created republican government, the founders gave popular sovereignty to the “people.” But the elite group of merchants, planters, landlords, industrialists, and professionals who organized constitutional government insisted that citizenship and suffrage be given to only a small group of people like themselves. In the United States, the elite “1 percent” who created constitutional government granted citizenship to adult, white, Protestant men with property, who made up only “10 percent” of the population. They then divided the vast majority—the “90 percent”—of people into two subordinate groups—“denizens” and “subjects”—who were assigned a different legal and social status.

People assigned to the “denizen” population—adult men without property, immigrants, women, and children—were given some rights but were denied citizenship, suffrage, or both. Although members of these groups have sometimes been described as “second-class” citizens, like passengers riding in coach on a train, they included immigrants, who were *residents* but not citizens, so it would be inappropriate to describe them as second-class *citizens*. Instead, they might be identified as “denizens,” as residents with some but not all of the rights extended to citizens.

Of course, many people possessed few if any rights in the new republic. Convicts, sailors, indentured servants, and slaves were under the direct control of public officials or private authorities, the adult white men whose “liberty” consisted in part of dominion over others. The people who were placed under the control of public officials and private authorities might be identified as “subjects.”

Because the men who designed constitutional government divided people into three groups, with a minority of citizens on top and a majority of denizens and subjects arranged below, the social structure of the new republic resembled a three-tiered pyramid. Of course, denizens and subjects objected to their subordinate status and fought to claim citizenship and suffrage in the

United States and in other republics. Their efforts slowly expanded citizenries within the republics. By 1920, a majority of the people living in the United States could claim citizenship and suffrage. Although the expansion of citizenship and suffrage inverted the pyramid and changed the *shape* of society in the republic, it did not change the social *structure* of inequality, which remained intact. Today, a large minority of residents in the republics remain as denizens (children and immigrants) and subjects (convicts, orphans, and people with some mental disabilities or contagious diseases). Still, the expansion of citizenries within the republics transformed social and political life for people in republics around the world.⁴

These three developments—the rise of the republics, the democratization of the republics, and the expansion of citizenries within the republics—also contributed to a decline of violence among states and a reduction of violence by state officials and nonstate actors.

Why did these important global changes occur?

They occurred because diverse social movements struggled to create constitutional governments in colonial and postcolonial settings, because social movements fought to democratize the republics, and because social movements labored to expand citizenship within the republics.⁵ Of course, they were not always or everywhere successful. Indeed, their work is far from done. Still, their collective efforts to change society have transformed the interstate system and the social contours and political practices of individual states around the world.

THE RISE AND DEMOCRATIZATION OF THE REPUBLICS

People living two hundred years ago would find it difficult to imagine that these changes could occur. At the time, constitutional government based on popular sovereignty was a novel and fragile political innovation.⁶ In 1800, it had existed for only a few years in the United States, “a marginal republic perched on the edge of a vast continent on the fringes of the European commercial system.”⁷ In France, Napoleon Bonaparte had abruptly terminated the Second Republic in 1799 and installed a dictatorship in its place. In Haiti, rebellious slaves successively defeated indigenous armies led by white planters and mulattoes and invading armies from Great Britain, Spain, and France and, in 1804, established a republic. But a foreign embargo and indigenous dictatorship prevented the nascent state from recovering from the

brutal twelve-year war and consigned the postcolonial state to political isolation and economic penury.⁸

Despite these inauspicious beginnings, social movements subsequently fought to create republics around the world, first in the Americas during the nineteenth century, then in Europe during the first half of the twentieth century, and then, after World War II, across Africa and Asia. Today, a vast majority of the 193-plus states in the world identify themselves as republics.⁹ Significantly, diverse political movements—capitalist, socialist, Islamic—all adhere to the principle of constitutional government, though they qualify it by describing their state as the “Republic of Korea” (capitalist), the “Socialist Republic of Vietnam” (socialist), and the “Islamic Republic of Pakistan” (Islamic).

Of course, the struggle to overthrow dynastic states and colonial empires around the world was a difficult and protracted process. Moreover, the rise of the republics was marred or compromised by three troublesome developments. First, some of the new republics, like their dynastic peers, conquered and colonized other people, engaging in “imperialist” behavior that compromised their stated commitment to popular sovereignty and the “rights of man.” Second, dictators seized power in many republics, made subjects of their citizens, and prevented them from exercising popular sovereignty in any meaningful way. Third, great powers and indigenous groups partitioned postcolonial states or seceded from republican states and founded separate states of their own, a development that typically led to conflict within and between divided states and successor republics.¹⁰


After World War II, the two most powerful republics—the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—together created the United Nations and other institutions to curb imperialism, prevent war, and promote decolonization, developments that contributed to the demise of dynastic states and the rise of republics in their place. Then, starting in the 1970s, the fall of dictators in capitalist countries in southern Europe, across Latin America, and in East Asia and the collapse of communist regimes in eastern Europe and the Soviet Union led to the widespread democratization of the republics, a process still under way in North Africa and the Middle East.¹¹ Unfortunately, the division and subdivision of states as a result of partition and secession accelerated during the past twenty years, most recently in Sudan.¹² In 2011, South Sudan seceded from Sudan and became an independent republic. But fighting has erupted between the two countries and between ethnic groups in South Sudan, where “heavily armed militias . . . are

now marching on villages and towns with impunity, sometimes with genocidal intent. 'We will kill everyone,' the representative of one ethnic militia vowed. 'We are tired of them.'"¹³

Of course, imperialism, dictatorship, and the conflicts associated with partition are still problems in many republics. Nonetheless, the spread and democratization of the republics has transformed the interstate system from one dominated by dynastic empires and their colonial empires to one dominated by sovereign and increasingly democratic republics.

THE EXPANSION OF CITIZENSHIP

The rise and democratization of the republics was accompanied by the expansion of citizenship within the republics. Initially, the architects, the men who designed constitutional government, reserved citizenship—the right to exercise popular sovereignty and to vote, bear arms, represent oneself in court, acquire and dispose of property, and make contracts—to a *minority* of



The Rise and Democratization of the Republics

residents in the republic. In the United States, they awarded citizenship only to adult, white, Protestant men with property, both as a matter of principle and of practice. In *principle*, they argued that citizenship should be restricted to responsible actors, to men capable of making rational political decisions without constraint (property ownership was thought to free men from coercion by landlords or employers). In *practice*, they believed that "liberty" for citizens was based, in part, on their dominion over others, the liberty to exercise their authority over wives, children, employees, servants, and slaves. So from the outset, the architects extended the rights associated with citizenship only to a minority of residents and denied some or all of these rights to a majority of people, who were divided into two large groups.


The architects gave some rights to "denizens," a group composed of women, children, and immigrants. People in this group were not allowed to vote, though they could sometimes inherit and dispose of property. Male children and immigrants might eventually become citizens when they reached their majority or if they naturalized. But authorities denied virtually all of the rights and opportunities associated with citizenship to "subjects." They made indentured servants, convicts, orphans, slaves, and people whom they viewed as threats to public health (people with mental disabilities or contagious diseases) or public safety (Native Americans, political dissidents, Japanese Americans) the subjects of state authorities. They also allowed *private* citizens the legal authority to control the denizens and subjects in their charge. By delegating state authority to nonstate actors, the architects gave husbands, fathers, employers, ship captains, and slave owners the right to assault, abuse, and even kill their wards without fear of legal consequence.

By dividing the populace and assigning groups different sets of rights, the architects created a pyramid-shaped, three-tiered social hierarchy. A minority of citizens sat on top of the pyramid. Denizens occupied the middle tier, and subjects formed the base of the pyramid. Together, denizen and subject populations made up a majority of residents in the early republics.¹⁴

During the next two hundred years, groups of denizens and subjects fought to claim citizenship. In the United States, for example, adult white men without property claimed citizenship in the early nineteenth century. Adult black men acquired citizenship in the mid-nineteenth century, and adult women, white and black, won citizenship in the early twentieth century, at least in the North. These successive expansions made citizenship available to a majority of people living in the republic. Over time and around the world, citizenship expanded in the republics, and today a majority of people

in a majority of the republics count themselves as citizens. This was a significant achievement. Still, it is important to recognize that large groups of people (chiefly minors and immigrants) are still treated as denizens, and a large number of people (convicts, orphans, illegal aliens, and people with mental disabilities or contagious diseases) remain the subjects of state authority. The acquisition of liberty and equality by a majority of people in the republics has been accompanied by persistent and durable subordination and inequality for a minority of people.¹⁵

The rise of the republics resulted in the demise of dynastic states and their colonial empires, a development that transformed the interstate system. The expansion of citizenship within the republics reshaped the social contours of countries around the world. Still, the rise and democratization of the republics did not eliminate dynastic states (Saudi Arabia) or bring an end to dictatorships in the republics (China). Moreover, the expansion of citizenship did not eliminate denizen and subject populations in either residual dynastic states or in democratic republics (the United States, France).



Social Change and Social Movements

Why has liberty and equality advanced? Why has subordination and inequality endured? The argument here is that social movements have been responsible for *both* developments. To understand the totality of global social change, it is necessary to examine the role that social movements have played in both advancing and retarding change. Social change during the past two hundred years has been the product of a multisided struggle among different types of social movements.

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

The architects of constitutional government in the republics invited citizens to exercise popular sovereignty in the new republics. They also invited people in dynastic states to create republics in which they might exercise popular sovereignty and claim "the rights of man." In the republics, citizens organized political parties and social movements to claim the opportunities provided by institutions in the state and civil society. Of course, the architects did not extend this invitation to denizens and subjects, whom they regarded as incapable of responsibly exercising popular sovereignty. Nevertheless, denizens and subjects in the republics and in dynastic states and their colonies fought to claim the rights and opportunities associated with citizenship, even though they were not invited or permitted to do so.

Early on, three *types* of social movements emerged: aspiring, altruistic, and restrictionist. These three types of movements have defined the field of social movements around the world during the past two hundred years. Like the "ideal types" used by Max Weber and Emile Durkheim, these types identify movements that mark the boundaries or corners of the field. As a practical matter, particular social movements have often combined features from different types of movements and drawn participants from different corners of the field. Moreover, different types of social movements have often changed their character or location on the field over time. Many aspiring movements have adopted restrictionist positions once they became citizens or acquired state power.

Aspiring Movements

Denizens and subjects have frequently organized aspiring movements in response to the inequalities imposed on them by state officials and private authorities. They have fought to create republics in dynastic states and colo-

change. Their work has ensured that the structure of social inequality remains *intact*. They have frequently used the authority given them by the state to engage in collective or individual violence against subordinate groups, or they have assumed their authority without official license, engaging in extra-legal or vigilante violence to defend social hierarchy and inequality.

Historically, restrictionist movements have included the Sons of Liberty, the Ku Klux Klan, and the Tea Party; prohibitionists and Mothers against Drunk Driving; fascists, the Taliban, and the Catholic Church; Fox News and the Heritage Foundation; and the National Association of Manufacturers and sometimes the American Federation of Labor.

For the most part, sociologists have excluded restrictionist movements, what Sidney Tarrow called “the ugly movements,” from the study of social movements.¹⁶ By defining social movements as “antiauthoritarian” challengers, scholars have excluded “pro-authoritarian” or restrictionist movements from the field, largely because they seek to preserve authority, defend inequality, and deny power to denizens and subjects. But restrictionist movements should be included because they have shaped the pace, direction, and meaning of social change. Also note that when aspiring movements acquired citizenship, they often adopted restrictionist views and prevented others (children, immigrants, orphans, and convicts) from acquiring comparable rights.

ACTORS AND ACTIVITIES

Participants in aspiring, altruistic, and restrictionist movements created bureaucratic organizations that enabled them to conduct strikes, stage protests, and wage war with their opponents on an ongoing basis. They also acted alone, as individuals, or as participants in informal social networks to engage in a wide range of activities—filing lawsuits, conducting hunger strikes, setting themselves on fire, migrating, and rioting—to express their anger and their determination to make social change. By focusing on the activities or “repertoires” of formal social movement *organizations*, many scholars have downplayed the contribution to change that disorganized actors and social networks have made. But there is little doubt that people alone or in social networks have contributed to real social change. For instance, the 1958 lawsuit filed by Richard and Mildred Loving, an interracial couple who were arrested in Virginia for violating the state’s law against interracial marriage (“The Racial Integrity Act”), eventually persuaded the US Supreme Court to

strike down restrictionist laws in sixteen states and allow interracial couples to marry.¹⁷ The individuals who filed lawsuits that led to Supreme Court decisions in the *Dred Scott* case, *Plessy v. Ferguson*, *Brown v. Board of Education*, and *Roe v. Wade* contributed to social change and persuaded other people to participate in abolitionist, civil rights, and pro-choice and pro-life movements and organizations.

Individual protesters have often ignited significant social change. In India, Anna Hazare conducted a hunger strike in 2011 to force the government to adopt anticorruption legislation. In Tunisia, Mohamed Bouazizi, a street vendor, set himself on fire to protest his mistreatment by police. His suicidal protest in December 2010 ignited widespread antigovernment protests that led to the fall of the dictatorship and to elections for a democratic government. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, individual anarchists who believed that dramatic acts of violence would incite widespread revolt assassinated the czar of Russia (1881), the president of France (1894), the empress of Austria (1898), the king of Italy (1900), the president of the United States (1902), and the archduke of Austria-Hungary (1914).¹⁸ Although these assassinations did not immediately trigger revolt, the archduke’s murder led to World War I, which contributed to revolutions in Ireland and Russia.

People who belong to social networks have also contributed to social change. Long before Facebook, people have encouraged their friends, relatives, and associates to engage in activities that resulted in change. The fifteen Buddhist monks who in 2012 set fire to themselves to protest the Chinese regime’s policies in Tibet and died as a result might have belonged to a social network that adopted suicide as a form of protest.¹⁹ People in social networks have also used desertion and migration as a form of protest. Slaves in the US South escaped their captors and fled, individually and in groups, to the North and to freedom. Sailors deserted ships. Indentured servants, Benjamin Franklin among them, deserted their masters and struck out on their own. Although scholars have not treated flight or migration as one of the “repertoires” of social movements, deserters, fugitives, and political refugees have contributed to social change. The flight of slaves contested the slave owners’ authority over fugitive slaves in the North and contributed to North-South conflict and, eventually, civil war. The exodus of dissidents from East Germany in 1989 led to the collapse of the communist regime. Demographers now treat migration less as the product of individual choice and more as the product of political and economic decisions made collective-

ly by members of informal social networks. In light of this, desertion, flight, and migration should be seen as repertoires that social networks used to make change.

Of course, it may be difficult to distinguish between actions by individuals and members of social networks. What should we make of the “107 Tunisians [who] tried to kill themselves by self-immolation in the first six months after [Mohamed] Bouazizi’s death”?²⁰ Were these the actions of individuals acting alone, like the anarchist assassins? Or were they members of social networks that encouraged this practice, like the Buddhist monks? We don’t yet know. This book is designed to encourage students and scholars to ask these kinds of questions and discover possible answers. The book provides a framework to help people begin that process and determine the origins of social movements that advanced, assisted, and resisted social change.

People sometimes took action as individuals and as members of informal social networks because they could make forceful demands for change without exposing themselves to the risks associated with joining formal organizations. Remember that it was often illegal for denizens and subjects to join formal organizations or engage in public protest. If they did, state and private authorities could identify, arrest, or assault them. During the Great Mutinies of 1797, striking British sailors purposely avoided creating a union or other formal organization because they wanted to prevent participants from being identified as mutineers by the authorities and then immediately hanged.²¹ To avoid retribution, denizens and subjects have often refused to join formal organizations and have instead engaged in protests—mutiny, riot, migration—that provided them with a degree of anonymity and protection from assault. The people who recently joined the protests in public squares across North Africa avoided joining dissident *organizations* because to do so might invite a visit from the regime’s secret police. Instead, they joined mass rallies and riots because the crowd allowed them to participate anonymously and because it provided some protection from violent assault by state police and private thugs.

It is important to appreciate how individuals, social networks, and formal organizations have employed a wide range of activities—lawsuits, hunger strikes, self-immolations, assassinations, mutinies, riots, desertions, marches, demonstrations, and armed rebellion—to express their anger, publicize their demands, recruit others to their cause, and persuade or force public and private authorities to make social change.²²

MOVEMENT GOALS

During the past two hundred years, diverse types and kinds of social movements have engaged in a wide range of activities to secure “liberty, equality, and fraternity,” at least for themselves. Scholars have paid more attention to the first two goals—liberty and equality—than to fraternity, or the solidarity provided by real or fictive communities. They have neglected struggles for community because they viewed these efforts as nonpolitical or reactionary. After all, many movements resist social change because they think it will undermine the solidarity that their community provides. But they should be included for two reasons. First, movements built communities to protect themselves from the rapid social change associated with capitalist development on a world scale. In this context, community building was a *response* to social change. Second, they built communities to create the social networks that could provide them with the human and economic resources they needed to survive. These *nonpolitical* social networks could then be mobilized to press for social and *political* change. In this sense, community building *advanced* social change. For example, the communities provided by the Catholic Church have been mobilized by aspiring movements (the United Farm Workers), altruistic movements (Catholic Charities), and restrictionist movements (anti-abortion, anti-contraception, anti-gay marriage groups). African American churches provided sanctuary (in both the literal and figurative sense) to participants in the early civil rights movement and provided the *private* resources that parishioners needed to sustain *public* protests.

The political scientist Robert Putnam famously argued that participation in private, apolitical bowling leagues contributed to participation in public, *political* activities and organizations. Still, it is important to take a broad view of the diverse goals that different types of social movements have adopted around the world.

SOCIAL CHANGE AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

The approach advanced here has several distinctive features. First, it starts with social change. It identifies a significant set of global social changes—the spread and democratization of republics in the interstate system and the expansion of citizenries within them—and argues that social movements have been collectively responsible for making change. Starting with social change invites scholars and students to identify the social movements that

shaped change, analyze their activities in relation to other movements, and examine the role they collectively played in advancing and/or retarding change. This strategy differs from the approach taken by many scholars, who start by examining a particular movement and then try to determine what change might have resulted from its activities or repertoires, an empirical task that has proved difficult. As Sidney Tarrow admitted, it has not been "particularly fruitful [for scholars] to examine the outcomes of single social movements on their own."²³ By starting with social change, it is easier then to determine how social movements contributed to change.

Second, this approach takes a very broad view of social change and social movements, examining global social change and social movements during the past two hundred years. It invites scholars and students to examine different types of movements (aspiring, altruistic, and restrictionist) that took diverse forms (individuals, social networks, formal organizations, and political parties), engaged in a wide range of activities (lawsuits and petitions, riot and migration, protest and insurrection), adopted a variety of goals (liberty, equality, and solidarity), and created political institutions to realize them (constitutional government based on popular sovereignty in a republic).

Moreover, this perspective invites scholars and students from different disciplines—history, sociology, political science, economics, women's studies, and ethnic studies—to contribute to a comprehensive understanding of global social change and social movements around the world. By and large, scholars regard their colleagues in other disciplines as strangers, aliens, or foreigners. They need to introduce themselves to one another's work and treat one another as friends and collaborators.

The ideas advanced here are not proprietary. I do not intend to patent and protect the ideas outlined here but instead offer them as "open-source code" that might help scholars and students to develop their own research applications and use their investigations to test and rebut the theories and arguments made here.

Third, this approach provides an optimistic view of social movements and social change. The rise and democratization of the republics and the expansion of citizenship has been a positive development. Still, these developments have been accompanied by persistent and durable inequalities. As a result, it suggests that scholars and students take an optimistic view about global social change, a perspective that is tempered by a realistic appreciation of its limits.

The next chapter examines the emergence of constitutional government based on popular sovereignty in the United States, the first republic of the modern era. Chapter 3 looks at the rise of the republics, the decline of dynastic empires and their colonies, and the creation of a new, republican interstate system after World War II. Chapter 4 examines two problems that have plagued the republics since their inception: dictatorship and division. Chapter 5 looks at the successive waves of democratization around the world during the postwar period, a process that continues today in North Africa and the Middle East. Chapter 6 looks at the expansion of citizenship during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Although some groups ascended into the citizenry, other groups, who were seen as threats to public safety or public health, were driven downward into denizen and subject populations. Chapter 7 examines the trajectory of these "descendants" and the "remainders," groups of people who remained in the assigned places throughout this period. These two chapters explore the complex character of social change in the United States. Chapter 8 looks at efforts by the civil rights, youth, feminist, and homosexual movements to expand citizenship during the postwar period and at recent efforts to extend citizenship to immigrants.

Chapter 9 examines the relation between social movements and global social change. Chapter 10 examines aspiring social movements and some of the problems they have encountered. Altruistic movements are examined in chapter 11 and restrictionist movements in chapter 12. The book concludes with a critical discussion of social movement theories and suggests how the framework advanced in this book might contribute both to academic research and to social change.